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Abstract 
Satellite-based navigation systems, as one of the key 
infrastructure of development in manned and unmanned 
guidance systems, is vulnerable against the simplest form of 
attack in Electronic Warfare environments. This led us to 
investigate the described vulnerability of an airborne GPS 
receiver against jammers which are located at various 
altitude above the targeted point. To do that and to avoid 
encountering with unavailability of classified information 
about military-class missiles, some simplification was done 
and the problem was investigated in “Worst Case” 
conditions. Finally, the flight profile and radiation pattern of 
the antenna of the GPS receiver were theoretically modeled. 
Considering some assumptions, the other parameters were 
derived from them. At the end, a simulation software was 
developed and some results were extracted. The data was 
represented figuratively and the dependency of efficacy of 
jamming operation to the jammer’s altitude and flight profile 
of the missile were discussed. 
1. Introduction 
Navigation, the art of finding the direction using 
predefined indications, have been evolved during the past 
century, especially after advent of long range wireless 
communication systems shortly before & during the WWII. 
The procedure of guiding & handing over a moving client, 
i.e. an aircraft, using fixed set of ground based RADARs was 
matured during the WWII [1], which are still in use. But the 
Achilles heel of these methods, was its dependency on 
existence of stable communication link between the 
reference points of navigation, i.e. TACAN1 stations[2], and 
the moving client. Also there was another inherent problem 
in maritime applications. Long distances between the 
navigational point of reference and the offshore vessels 
beside the curvature of the Earth, makes the ships 
unreachable by signals of common RADAR systems. OTH 
radars2 can be used, but their natural inability to locate the 
                                                          
1 TACtical Air Navigation system 
2 Over The Horizon RADAR 
3 Such as Decca (commissioned in 1942 & decommissioned in 2000~2001), 
LORAN or LOng Range Navigation system (commissioned in 1942 & some 
variant are still in use), OMEGA (commissioned in 1972 & decommissioned 
in 1997). 
client accurately and their structural and functional 
complexity, makes them non-functional for high speed 
applications, such as guiding cross-pacific airplanes.  
During the 40s to 70s, some ground-based, long range 
navigational systems developed, mostly for maritime 
applications which some of them are still in use partially, 
mostly as backup navigation aids3[3, 4]. When the space-
based communication systems were economically and 
technologically justified, the precursors were sent into the 
space, the TRANSIT 4 [5] And SECOR 5 [6]. Finally, the 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems, the GNSS(s), were 
designed and deployed, basically for military use, and are 
still under development[7]. Also some other verity of this 
system studied, developed and deployed by some private-
sector organizations6[8], all of them are using triangulation 
method of navigation. But there were & there are concerns 
about intentionally or unintentionally jamming of these 
networks in various levels, from the control & monitoring to 
the positioning systems and subsystems [9]. Some counter-
jamming, counter-spoofing and counter-deception methods 
developed specially for Global Positioning Systems, the 
American version of GNSS, the GPS. These methods beside 
the ability of accurate positioning make the GPS, and maybe 
the GLONASS, reliable enough for military applications. 
The technological advancements are double-edged 
swords and parties of a military conflicts always tries to use 
this fact. One of the simplest form of Electronic Warfare is 
the Denial of Access [10]. As long as the input of a GPS 
receiver is saturated by unwanted signals with sufficient level 
of power, the positioning is impossible or at least unstable 
enough for stringent guidance of clients. This type of EW 
operation is not efficient but its infrastructural hardware is so 
simple to design and also very cheap to fabricate. Also more 
sophisticated and more expensive type of jammers, i.e. the 
Repeater Jammers or GPS deception systems, have to create 
a suitable level of jamming power at receiver’s input. So the 
problem of effectiveness of a jamming can be reduced to 
investigation of Jamming to Signal Ratio, the JSR, at 
receiver’ input [11]. 
4 Also named as NAVSAT and Navy Navigation Satellite System (NNSS), 
commissioned in 1964 
5 Abbreviation for Sequential Collation of Range, operational in 70s. 
6 Such as Iridium Communication Satellite Constellation 
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The most important targets of these types of jamming, 
are costly Cruise Missiles and some other navigationally 
precise guided weapons or platforms, i.e. Unmanned Air 
Vehicles. As the inertial properties of a system can be used 
sufficiently to describe its mechanical behavior, i.e. its 
acceleration, velocity and location, most of these guided 
weapons and platforms are using Inertial Navigation System, 
the INS, as their primary mean of navigation. Some auxiliary 
tools, such as TERCOM7, DSMAC8 or Laser Altimeter, also 
have been used to correct the inherent integration offset of 
INS during longtime operation[12]. But the periodic use of 
GPS data is common, because of its precision & all-weather 
availability. 
Despite of limitations on access the classified 
information about Cruise Missiles, the effect of variable 
altitude jammer on the GPS receiver onboard of a Cruise 
Missile were focused and investigated, using open-source 
and non-classified information. Finally, the question of “Is 
the Jammer at higher altitude is more effective?”  was 
answered. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. The “Worst Case” Method of Modeling 
Unavailability of classified information, wide range of 
choices for GPS receiver and its accessories & different 
possible installation configuration of GPS receiver onboard 
of its carrier besides various possible jamming techniques 
and hardware, jammer installation and configuration, 
surrounding terrain and many other unknown or unattainable 
parameters caused the problem to be modeled in “Worst 
Case” conditions. So the principal & effective properties and 
parameters are chosen so that the “Real” conditions are 
practically more attainable and logically more reasonable. 
The results of final model will show the effect of our 
assumption in “Worst” reasonable case.  
2.2. The Problem; Description and Simplification 
The described problem can be reduced as a Line-of-
Sight communication between jammer and GPS receiver. 
Because of the minor effect of atmospheric bending, 
refraction and absorption, sharp-edge diffraction & ducting 
at operating frequency of GPS receiver and engaged GPS 
Jammer, this assumption is logically and scientifically 
reasonable. 
To discard the propagative effect of atmospheric 
phenomena, such as clouds, the conditions assumed to be as 
worst as possible for receiver. So the described 
communication link will be established in homogenous & 
isotropic transmission medium, i.e. the dry air. 
To maintain the integrity of research, the gain of 
Jammer’s & GPS receiver’s antennas assumed to be 
different, i.e. Gj and Gr respectively. Assuming the existence 
of stable communication link during the jamming operation, 
a tracking system is required to point the main lobe of 
jammer’s antenna toward the GPS receiver. To eliminate this 
requirement and its associated errors at this point, we 
                                                          
7 Terrain Contour Matching 
assumed the jammer’s antenna to be Omni-directional, a 
simple inherent tracking method in mobile communication 
systems. 
To model in “Worst Case”, all of the performance-
related parameters of the Jammer and the GPS receiver were 
assumed to be perfectly matched, ranging from the 
polarization of the antennas to its resonant frequency. While 
this assumption will let us to maximize the effectiveness of 
jamming operation, they are not so efficient in real 
applications and various kind of mismatches occurs. 
Some unknown but important and complex issues which 
must be modeled and simulated properly are: 
 Flight profile: The way in which the GPS-receiver’s 
platform, i.e. the missile, approaches its target. 
 Location of jammer: The position of the jammer in 
respect with targeted spot. 
 Gain of receiver’s antenna & its orientation 
including the effect of missile’s structural 
complexity on it & its orientation during the fight. 
Knowing these yet-unknown parameters finalizes the 
simulation of efficacy of jamming operation.  
2.2.1. Flight Profile 
As the Cruise Missiles are guidable & presumably 
programmable platforms, three types approaching procedure 
can be considered for various types of them. But to avoid 
loose of generality, the calculation will be done 
parametrically for an unknown flight profile which covers all 
of the mentioned scenarios. 
Various types of targets make the manufacturer to 
develop various type of Cruise Missiles. For instance, 
ground-to-sea and sea-to-sea cruise missiles usually hits their 
target after fast increase in altitude and hitting them from 
above. Contrary to these family of missiles, some other air-
to-ground and maybe ground-to-ground missiles hits their 
targets after a gentle decrease in their altitude, hitting from 
side or after a sharp decrease in their altitude hitting from 
above [12]. These methods of hitting targets, which named 
as the Direct Hit, the Overhead Hit and the Enhanced 
Overhead Hit, are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Different and possible scenarios hitting targets by 
cruise missiles. 
There is a complicated issue which must be solved 
before modeling the flight profile to be started. In reality, the 
movement of airborne platform occurs in 3-Dimentional 
8 Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator 
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coordination system. To answer the question of “Is the need 
of 3-Dimentional calculation of results, a requirement?”, the 
reasons of that requirement are to be discussed. Some of them 
are: 
 Non-symmetrical overall gain of receiver antenna 
(including all the coupling-effects from surrounding 
structures while it is installed on its position in the 
body of the missile) in respect with its perpendicular 
main axis. 
 Inefficiency of interception effort to focus the main 
lobe of the Jammer’s antenna on moving platform 
during its approach procedure. These inefficiencies 
may be caused by the interception errors, weather 
condition, etc. 
 Non-isotropic properties of transmission medium. 
For instance, the existence of fog, rain, different 
types of clouds, etc. along the flight profile. 
 Non-isotropic properties of surroundings such as the 
Earth composition and its terrains. 
To study the issue in “Worst Case”, we assume the last 
three of these causes are not applicable. So the interception 
method and system of interception have assumed to be 
completely efficient and precise. Also the properties of 
transmission medium discussed in 2.2 too (clear sky is 
assumed). The assumption of LoS Communication link 
vanishes the effect of surroundings.  
Finally, without loose of generality, the overall gain of 
receiver antenna assumed to be symmetrical, but not 
isotropic, in respect with its perpendicular main axis. This 
assumption will cease the effect of structural complexity of 
Missile. So without loose of generality and “Worst Case” 
conditions, the problem has simplified into 2-Dimentional 
coordination system. 
We need a general, or at least as general as possible, 
equation to model the described flight profiles. Obviously the 
final equation, as shown in (1), contains some adjustable 
parameter which will determine the type of flight profile.  
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Where CDF is missile’s diving factor, CPP is the variable 
parameter which controls the position of maximum altitude, 
CMA controls the maximum altitude along the flight path & 
CCA is altitude of missile at its cruise phase of flight. As long 
as the location of target assumed to be at x=0, equation (1) 
models all the three flight profile which illustrated in Figure 
1. The tentative presented equation covers all the required 
properties of flight path if its variables to be adjusted 
properly.  
2.2.2. Location of Jammer 
To increase the intensity of jamming signal in 
surrounding areas around the target, which may extend for 
tens of kilometers, the GPS jammers are installed to operate 
in vicinity of the important targets, practically. Also the large 
                                                          
9  Some missile rotate after launch to orient their INS and some other 
navigational instruments, but after a while they will be sterilized and no 
rotation along its longitude axis will happen 
distance between the lunch-site of the missile and the spotted 
targets, makes the small distance between the target and 
position of GPS jammer to be neglect-able. Due to these 
consideration, herein, we assume the GPS jammer exactly 
located in same position as the location of the target but at 
altitudes which can be higher than target’s altitude. 
Assumed Omni-directional property of radiation pattern 
of the jammer’s antenna causes the 2-Dimentional 
calculation to be deployable. 
The reader may note the effect of Earth, as a reflecting 
body, has neglected. But due to outstanding assumption of 
unity gain for Jammer antenna, the final gain of antenna in 
real configuration can be calculated using methods which 
were described in text books & the results can be replaced in 
simulation software. 
The altitude of jamming system considered to be 
variable, ranging from ground-zero point to altitude as high 
as tens of thousands of meters [12]. The way in which the 
altitude of jamming system changes is not a matter of interest 
in our study. Also the operational parameters of the jammer 
are independent of the variation of its altitude.  
2.2.3. The Gain of Receiver Antenna & Its Orientation 
As documented, data extraction from at least 4 
NAVSTAR satellites is required for triangulation to be done 
[7]. These satellites are moving at speeds as high as 14000 
Km per hour and at altitudes as high as 22000 Km above the 
surface of the Earth. So these satellites are always crossing 
the observable sky, appearing and setting down periodically. 
If the location of observer assumed to be flat, he can detect 
eight to eleven NAVSTAR satellites at any arbitrary moment 
of time, which are moving in different direction in the sky. If 
this observer is equipped with a GPS receiver, it will analyze 
all the received signals and choose the most powerful and 
clear one as clocking reference and next three for 
triangulation purpose. 
 
To receive more powerful signals from satellites and 
also to reduce the effect of reflections form surrounding 
terrains and buildings, the main lobe of GPS receiver antenna 
must be positioned upward, With almost constant gain over 
a reasonable angle around its main axis. The gain decreases 
as the angle of signal arrival direction nears 𝜋 2⁄  or
−𝜋
2⁄ . 
The properties of structural composition of missile will 
eliminate the reception of signal at angles near π. As the 
Cruise missiles are dirigible platforms, they will not rotate 
along their longitude axis during the guided flight phase9. So 
the axis of main lobe of the GPS receiver’s antenna will 
always be perpendicular to the flight path, and is upward 
while the missile flying horizontally.  
By advancement of phase array antenna and to reduce 
the effect of unwanted source of signals at same or adjacent 
frequency bands, some complicated algorithms and systems 
have been suggested [13], which uses this technique to track 
the satellites and to intercept their signals by lowering the 
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gain of antenna in other directions. This type of systems 
usually require bigger antennas & are more complicated & 
expensive. These concept is out of interest of our study as 
detailed information about their actual performance & 
efficiency are not available and mostly are unreliable. 
2.3. Mathematical Modeling  
To calculate the efficacy of jamming operation against 
the airborne GPS receiver, choose of received jamming-
signal’s power level at receiver’s antenna will not reduce the 
generality of study. This is due to the fact of Jamming-to-
Signal Ratio 10  is a very good parameter showing the 
performance of a receiver in electronic warfare environment. 
As the power of received C/A or P signals are not under 
control11, the only variable and controllable parameter is the 
strength of jamming signal. 
2.3.1. Modeling the Angle of Arrival12 
Calculation of AoA for GPS receiver while receiving the 
jamming signal is essentially a milestone of this work. The 
assumption of virtual tracking of missile by jamming system, 
as describe in 2.2, has led to calculate the exact direction of 
received signal during the flight and at any arbitrary point of 
flight path. So the relationship between the AoA and the 
mathematically modeled flight path must be calculated and 
proved. 
 
Figure 2. the figurative representation of simplified problem to 
calculate the normalized received power but the GPS receiver 
antenna onboard of missile 
The altitude of jammer assumed to be hjammer above 
target. it is simple to prove the AoA can be calculated as 
  ),()(
2
, Jammerjammer hxHxShxAoA 

  (2) 
After some algebraic calculations, the final equation to 
calculate the AoA can be simplified as 
                                                          
10 will be abbreviated as JSR, as seen in various documents. 
11 The next generation of NAVSTAR satellites will use phase 
arrayed antennas to control the coverage area and also the 
received power level in desired areas up to %20 of its nominal 
values [7]. 
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The S, as the slope of h(x), is a pure function of x and is 
independent of height of jammer. But the H, the Los distance, 
is dependent of x and hjammer simultaneously. 
2.3.2. Modeling the Antennas’ Radiation Pattern 
The radiation pattern of GPS receiver’s antenna must be 
considered too. Ideally the actual and measured values must 
be places for calculation. But due to lack of detailed 
information about military-class GPS receivers and its 
accessories, the radiation pattern have been modeled too. 
Using this model will not reduce the generality of study as 
 The measured data with suitable resolution can be 
uploaded to the final software. 
 The presented model covers all the requirements 
such as antenna’s main-lobe properties, side-lobe 
level properties and back-lobe modeling. 
The model uses five adjustable parameters and can be 
simplified as  
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Where the CMLFZ 13is proportional to the position of the 
first zero of the main-lobe of antenna, CBLS 14controls the size 
of the back-lobes, the CST & CSP 15are changing the position 
and size of side-lobes, CMLS 16is proportional to the size of the 
main-lobe and gMax, the maximum size of radiation pattern, 
have been used to normalized the calculated radiation 
pattern. Figure 3 shows the various radiation pattern which 
are created by suggested model & the orientation of its flying 
platform. The model is capable of simulating wide verity of 
radiation patterns, ranging from almost Omni-directional to 
high gain one. 
12 Will be abbreviated as AoA. 
13 Main Lobe First Zero 
14 Back Lobe Size 
15 Side Lobe Position & Side Lobe Translation 
16 Mail Lobe Size 
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As the described, in simplified problem, the missile flies 
to its target directly in 2-dimentional coordination system. 
This is why only one of E-plane or H-plane radiation patterns 
have been used. For 3-dimentional calculations, use of both 
is this patterns are essential, which is out of interest of this 
work. 
 
Figure 3. Various radiation patterns of the GPS receiver antenna 
onboard of missile 
2.3.3. Modeling the Final Normalized Received Power 
Friis equation which is governing the received power by 
the receiver’s antenna, the PR, can be calculated as 
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Where c is the speed of light in ms-1, f is the frequency 
of propagated electromagnetic wave in Hz, PJ is the radiated 
power of jammer in Watt, GJ is the gain of gain of jammer’s 
antenna which assumed to be 1, GR is the gain of GPS 
receiver’s antenna (GR=g(AoA)=g(θ)) & R is the LoS 
distance between the jammer and the missile in meters. 
As the transmission frequency and radiated power are 
constant during the jamming operation, these parameters will 
be considered as constant values. Also the LoS distance 
between the jammer and missile is a function of h(x) and 
hjammer. So equation (6) can be simplified as 
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As k is a real and constant coefficient, it has no 
considerable effect in our calculation and we can assume it 
as unity for simplicity, without loss of generality. Also the θ 
is AoA of received signal; So (7) can be rearranged as 
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Hence, in Worst Case, the received power of the GPS 
receiver’s antenna from jammer transmitter is mostly under 
influence of distance of missiles from targeted point & the 
altitude of jammer. 
2.4. Simulation 
To deploy the model numerically, to check its validity & 
to see if it is applicable or not, a GUI-based simulator has 
developed in MATLAB R2013a. The simulator uses 
adjustable controls for various parameters of flight-path, 
radiation pattern of GPS receiver’s antenna and the height of 
GPS Jammer. Finally, four essentially important curves can 
be plotted. As Figure 8 illustrates, these curves are: 
 Flight path: the altitude profile of the cruise missile (in 
meters) during its flight as a function of distance (in 
kilometers) 
 Normalized radiation pattern of the GPS receiver’s 
antenna: the polar curve of the radiation pattern has 
been plotted with 90 degrees of clockwise rotation with 
one degree of resolution. 
 AoA: the angle-of-arrival of jammer’s signal (in 
degrees) as a function of distance (in kilometers) 
 Normalized flight profile vs. normalized received 
power from GPS jammer. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Overall block diagram of the developed 
simulation software 
The interpretation of these four plots will be discussed 
later in detail. Without introducing any limitation, the 
maximum distance of missile from targeted point & the 
resolution of calculations have been adjusted to 50km & 
100m respectively.  
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3. Results & Findings 
To investigate the results, we need to generate them by 
introduction of some EW and scenarios. There is an 
essentially important condition which must be obeyed; each 
scenario will be tested twice, once while the jammer is a 
ground-based transmitter & once with an airborne jammer at 
predefined altitude. The scenarios are 
1. Direct Hit attack (DH) 
2. Over-Head Hit attack (OH) 
3. Enhanced Over-Head Hit Attack (EOH) 
Table. 1 listed the parameters of (1) to generate these 
scenarios. The flight path of these scenarios are shown in 
Figure 2.  
Table 1.The values of four adjustment parameters of flight 
profile of the missile. 
Scenario CDF CPP CMA CCA 
DH 1.06 18.1329 50 297.838 
OH 1.06 1.25268 50 297.838 
EOH 1.06 1.25268 1915.63 297.838 
 
In Direct-Hit scenario, the missile mostly launched by 
an airborne platform, e.g. a bomber aircraft, and decreases its 
altitude gradually [12]. On the other hand, in Over-Head Hit 
and enhanced version of it, the missile will start its final 
phase of maneuvers in last few kilometers of its flight [12]. 
So the selected values to adjust the flight paths are 
reasonable. 
Table 2 listed the parameters of radiation pattern of GPS 
receiver’s antenna. Also Figure 3 illustrates the selected 
radiation pattern of GPS receiver’s antenna by bolded black 
line curve. 
Table 2. Selected value of adjustment parameters of (5) to 
generate the suitable radiation pattern for GPS receiver 
CMLFZ CMLS CBLS CST CSP 
0.708461 28.8462 67.3808 0.028845 2.65721 
 
Use of patch antennas in GPS receivers, low altitude 
flight of Cruise Missiles during their cruise phase of flight, 
effect of metallic components beneath the installation 
position of GPS receiver inside the missile’s body & 
abatement of receiving the reflected GPS signals form Earth 
or surrounding terrains are the main reasons to justify the 
selected values, listed in Table 2. The HPBW of the selected 
radiation pattern is approximately 162˚, symmetrically ~81˚ 
around the main axis. Also it represents two alike side-lobes, 
approximately -6.5 dB below the maximum achievable gain. 
A back-lobe of -10 dB below described maxima exists too.  
As the variability of jammer’s altitude is a key feature of 
this work, the angle-of-arrival of jammer’s signal has been 
calculated and figuratively illustrated in Figure 4. Due to 
stronger jamming signal & start of procedures to approach 
the target in its vicinity, the last 20Km missile’s path toward 
the target has more interesting features. 
As the AoA of jamming signal for various scenarios 
have been calculated, the normalized received power from 
jammer by the GPS receiver’s antenna can be calculated too. 
Figure 5 illustrates results of this calculation for various 
scenarios, separately, and for jammers with different 
altitudes of 0, 800m and 4300m. the red dashed line on Figure 
5 represents the minimum “Effective Jamming Power Level” 
and considered to be -13dB of the maximum attainable value. 
 
Figure 4. The Angle of Arrival (AoA) of the jamming signal 
for a) air-born GPS jammer, b) ground-based GPS jammer 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Efficacy of EW operation 
In reality, the efficacy of electronic warfare operation(s) 
against the positioning capabilities of guided weapons 
depends on many factors. As we focused on one of the 
secondary positioning systems of a cruise missile, the 
onboard GPS receiver, the power level of received jamming 
signal is a key factor to estimate the efficacy. So higher 
power of received jamming signal will increase the 
probability of successful jamming operation. But as the 
cruise missile’s navigational platform mostly uses of various 
methods, we will not & we cannot decide what will happen 
then. It highly depends on type of cruise missile and its 
algorithms for navigation & its subsystems. 
The AoA of jammer’s signal at GPS receiver’s antenna 
have been illustrated in Figure 4 for different scenarios and 
jammer at various altitudes. As seen, each pair of curves, i.e. 
the OH for airborne and ground based jammer, are showing 
similar behavior but with different rates and scales. The final 
received power depends simultaneously to the AoA & the 
radiation pattern of the receiver’s antenna. Each scenario 
covers three separate situations in which the GPS jammer’s 
altitude is one of the 0, 0.8 & 4.3 Km above the ground zero. 
As seen in all of scenarios, the normalized received power 
for hjammer=0 and hjammer=0.8Km is nearly identical. So use of 
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GPS jammer at low altitudes for simulated flight profiles and 
radiation pattern of GPS receiver’s antenna is not efficient & 
will not change the efficacy of EW operation impressively.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Various scenarios of approach a) Direct Hit, b) 
Over-Head Hit, c) Enhanced Over-Head Hit 
Finally, to investigate the operational behavior of GPS 
receiver while is not saturated by jamming signal, the 
Reinstate Time, or TR, have been defined as duration in 
which the GPS receiver is not effected by the jammer’s 
signal. As seen in Figure 6, in OH scenario, the missile at 
distances of about 3.92Km and 5Km away of targeted spot, 
is not jammed. For a conventional cruise missile at 550 mph 
(245.872m/s) of speed [12], the TR can be calculated as 508 
& 1423 milliseconds for 125m and 360m gaps, respectively. 
As the GPS receiver starts to locate its platform in Hot Start 
mode, both of these values seems to be sufficient for it to 
extract its current position again. This means the missile 
corrects its navigational offsets ~3.9Km away of targeted 
point & will hit it after 15.86 seconds. This fails the EW 
operation and the missile will hit the targeted spot using its 
offset-eliminated INS. 
 
Figure 6.  the Reinstate Time of incoming missile with OH 
scenario of approach. 
As the TR and its associated concluded results are highly 
dependent of the type of cruise missile and also the technical 
performance of installed GPS receiver, detailed discussion 
about the results requires detailed information about. it is 
very useful to calculate and investigate the issue while the 
detailed information is available. 
4.1.1. Direct Hit (DH) scenario 
Direct Hit, as the simplest form of attack against usually 
fixed targets, is the most vulnerable scenario in EW 
environment. As seen in Figure 5(a), the slow rate of change 
of AoA caused considerable TR for ground based and low 
altitude jammers. For high altitude jamming, the GPS 
receiver on board of missile is not jammed from 30 to ~12 
kilometers away of target and another TR can be measured 
too. As increase of jammer’s altitude nears the nearest TR, 
use of low altitude jammer seems to be more efficient. 
4.1.2. Over-head Hit (OH) Scenario 
The interesting feature of rapid dive to the spotted target, 
caused the OH scenario to be more complicated for jamming. 
During its route to the target, the missile and its onboard GPS 
receiver experience various levels of power from jamming 
source. But there are multiple points, between 10 to 4 
Kilometers from target, in which the received power is below 
the Effective Jamming Power Level. The associated 
Reinstate Time at these points are long enough for GPS 
receiver to locate the missile precisely. As the altitude of GPS 
jammer increases, the position of these points drifts away of 
target, but is neglect-able. Figure 5(b) illustrates the issue. 
4.1.3. Enhanced Over-Head Hit (EOH) Scenario 
While the missile flies along an EOH profile, as seen in 
Figure 5(c), there are no measureable Reinstate Time in last 
20Km of flight. The received power level is almost identical 
for ground based, low and high altitude jammers in last 6Km, 
but promising decrement of received power level from high 
altitude jammer shows the EW operation could be successful 
for jammer(s) located at lower altitudes. Also there is a sharp 
decrease at x=1, caused by the local extrema. If happens, the 
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associated Reinstate Time at this point seems to be too short 
for GPS receiver’s correlator(s) to extract the location, even 
while it works on Hot Start mode. 
Table 3. The Summerized results of jamming operation 
against missiles at various scenarios 
  Attack Scenarios 
 
 Direct Hit Over-head Hit 
Enhanced 
Over-head 
Hit 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
J
a
m
m
er
 Ground 
Based 
Effective Effective 
More 
Effective 
Low  
Altitude 
Effective Effective 
More 
Effective 
High 
Altitude 
Less 
Effective 
Effective 
More 
Effective 
5. Conclusion 
The problem of efficacy of jamming against an airborne 
GPS receiver has simplified logically and physically. To 
prevent loss of generality & to increase its applicability, the 
Cruise Missiles are chosen as the flying platform. As the 
detailed information about these missiles are classified & 
unavailable, the flight profile and the radiation pattern of the 
GPS receiver’s antenna have modeled. Also to ensure the 
validity of results, the problem studied in “Worst Case” 
conditions. The Direct Hit (DH), Over-head Hit (OH) and 
Enhanced Over-Head Hit (EOH) scenarios have chosen to 
investigate the effect of ground based, low altitude and high 
altitude jammers. As listed in Table 3, the EOH is the most 
vulnerable scenarios and will be jammed effectively. But the 
other 2 scenarios has the key advantage of measurable long 
Reinstate Time(s). 
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